Part not directly related to Knowledge Sharing (KS) about "Formalizing, Organizing and Evaluating Cooperation Related Tasks, Instruments, Rules, Best Practices and Evaluation Measures" (this part extends this one about Knowledge Sharing) _______________________________________________________________________________________________________

Dr Philippe A. MARTIN

Table of Contents (to hide/reveal titles of 3rd/4th level subsections, click 3rd or 4th)

0. Input (Thing Worked On): Preference, Commitment, ... 0.1. (Dis)Satisfaction, Utility Units/Functions/Profile and Preference 0.2. Right, Duty, Contract 0.3. KB of Agent 1. Attribute for Cooperativeness and Ethics/Fairness 1.1. Ethicality/Fairness 1.2. Attribute Used As Parameter For Calculating An Ethicality 2. Situation for Cooperation Or Fair/Ethical Acts 2.0. Introduction 2.0.1. Cooperative Situation/System/Agent/Tool 2.0.2. Positive/Ethical/Fair Process 2.1. Ethical/Fair Decision Making Process 2.1.1. Social welfare function using weights to avoid tactical-voting and majority-dictatorship 2.1.2. Decision making based on logical argumentation and non-restrictive preferences 2.2. Pre-process for Decision Making: Checks (Workflow, Specs) 2.2.1. Gathering_of_Like-or-dislike-or-preference_of_agents 2.2.2. Checking_of_the_addition-or-update_of_Like-or-dislike-or-preference_of_agents 2.2.3. For Information Analysis/Synthesis 2.2.4. For Tasks/Answering To Be Performed Timely, Fully And According to Specifications 2.3. Liberty/Equity/Optimality Uncompatible/Compatible/Justified State Or Process 2.3.1. State-or-process_wrt_no_more-than-minimal_liberty-restriction 2.3.2. State-or-process_wrt_Equity 2.3.3. State-or-process_wrt_optimality_of_satisfaction_repartition 2.4. Specializations, e.g. Repartitions (Work Allocation, ...) 2.4.1. For Work Allocation 3. Axioms (Default Beliefs/Preferences, ...) for Cooperation Or Fair/Ethical Acts and Their Justifications 3.1. 3.2. Ethical Aggregation Rules 3.2.1. Ethical Aggregation Rules 3.2.2. For Fair Evaluations 3.2.3. General Informal Rules

0. Input (Thing Worked On): Preference, Commitment, ...

0.1. (Dis)Satisfaction, Utility Units/Functions/Profiles and Preferences

0.2. Right, Duty, Contract

    (Agreed_situation .[?agents,  {1..* ?other_situation}, ?prefered_situation] ?as
      = Situation_that_is_object_of_a_preference_by_some_agents,  //always?
//no: /^ Preference_situation,
      := [a Preference_situation, agent: {2..* agent} ?agents,
                           input: {1..* Situation ?other_situation}
                           input: a Situation ?preferred_situation,  output: ?preferred_situation ],
      \. Commitment  
         (Situation_implicitly-or-explicitly_agreed_by_many_persons 
           = situation_that_is_a_right-or-duty_according-to_many_persons )
    )


Dissatisfaction_of_an_agent_for_doing .[Agent ?ag, Process ?p] ?a  /^ Attribute_expressing_a_dissatisfaction,
 := [ [?p  agent: ?ag] => [ [?p attr: ?a] believer: ?a] ].


one_of_the_most_relevant_agent_for_this_process _(Process ?p, Agent ?ag)
 := [ the Dissatisfaction_of_this_agent_for_doing _(?p,?ag) value: (a value =< 
       (the Dissatisfaction_of_this_agent_for_doing _(?p,(each ?ag != ?a))) ) ].
    //doing ?p would cost less (or same) to ?ag than to any other 
//note: below, this relation is always from a ?p being an Ethicality_compatible_state-or-process_wrt _(...)




/* -----------
binding  legitimate  ethical  fair 
http://www.cnrseditions.fr/philosophie/7816-ethique-et-polemiques.html  Jero^me RAVAT


Right_or_duty  /^ Situation,
 \. e{ (Duty  
         \. (Commitment_based_duty .[Agent ?ag, Process ?p, 0..1 Time ?t] 
              := [?a agent of: (a Commitment object: [?a agent of: ?p, time: ?t])] )
            (Duty_coming_from_being_one_of_the_most_relevant_agent_to do_something .[Agent ?ag, Process ?p] 
              := [?p one_of_the_most_relevant_agent_for_this_process: ?ag] )
       )
       Natural-or-legal_right
     }
    c{ (Legal_right-or-obligation := "law/custom of a particular culture or of the egal system of 
                                      a particular government, hence created by people" )
       (Natural_right-or-obligation
          = Universal_right-or-obligation  inalienable_right-or-obligation,
          annotation: " 'Natural laws become cultural laws' or conversely ?",
          \. (Human_natural_right-or-obligation 
               \. Right_of_the_1948-United-Nations-Universal-Declaration-of-Human-Rights )
             Animal_natural-right-or-obligation )
     }.
     needs_based_right
     contribution_based_right
     meritocracy-or-elitocracy_based_right //'All are equal before the law'
                                           // (arbitrary)  inequity aversion 
         https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Equity_theory  judgments of equity and inequity are derived from
 comparisons between one's self and others based on inputs and outcomes. I
Classical liberalism calls for equality before the law, not for equality of outcome.[18] 
Classical liberalism opposes pursuing group rights at the expense of individual rights.[19]
  
"Property right" = "Just acquisition" (esp. by working on unowned things) 
                +? "Just transfer" since voluntary (non-coerced) transactions always have a property called 
--------- */

0.3. KB of Agent

1. Attribute for Cooperativeness and Ethicality/Fairness

1.1. Ethicality/Fairness

1.2. Attribute Used As Parameter For Calculating An Ethicality

2. Situation for Cooperation Or Fair/Ethical Acts

2.0. Introduction

2.0.1. Cooperative Situation/System/Agent/Tool

2.0.2. Positive/Ethical/Fair Situation

2.1. Ethical/Fair Decision Making Process

2.1.1. Social welfare function using weights to avoid tactical-voting and majority-dictatorship

2.1.2. Decision making based on logical argumentation and non-restrictive preferences

2.2. Pre-process: Checks (Workflow, Specs)

2.2.1. Gathering_of_Like-or-dislike-or-preference_of_agents

2.2.2. Checking_of_the_addition-or-update_of_Like-or-dislike-or-preference_of_agents

2.2.3. For Information Analysis/Synthesis

2.2.4. For Tasks/Answering To Be Performed Timely, Fully And According to Specifications

2.2.4.1. For Questions to Be Timely And Fully Answered

2.3. Liberty/Equity/Optimality Uncompatible/Compatible/Justified State or Process

2.3.1. State-or-process_wrt_no_more-than-minimal_liberty-restriction

2.3.2. State-or-process_wrt_Equity

2.3.3. State-or-process_wrt_optimality_of_satisfaction_repartition

2.4. Specializations, e.g. Repartitions (Work Allocation, ...)

2.4.1. For Work Allocation

3. Axioms (Default Beliefs/Preferences, ...) for Cooperation Or Fair/Ethical Acts and Their Justifications

3.1.

Ethical_criterion = Attribute_used_as_a_parameter_for_calculating_an_ethicality,
 = ^"Criterion that statistically|majoritarily directly/indirectly benefit/contribute
     (and hence, in a sense, specialize) the Optimality_of_satisfaction_repartition criteria)".
   __[<=> "Any Ethical_criterion has to statistically directly/indirectly optimally benefit
           the ethical satisfaction of all agents able to experience (di-)satisfaction 
           (→ no arbitrary preference -> no dictatorship)"
      => "Any ethical action has to be an optimum (hence be logic too) wrt. available resources and
          the ethical criteria/preferences of the action's recipients" ],
 \. Optimality_of_satisfaction_repartition
    (Equity_of_satisfaction_repartition
      = ^"Criterion referring to the optimal and equal affectation of available resources wrt. ethical criteria"
    ) // also an universal/inescapable one: even voluntary martyrs do not escape it since their 
      //                                    satisfaction come from other's people satisfaction
    (No_more-than-minimal_liberty-restriction
      = ^"Criterion referring to the non-restriction of a (di-)satisfaction experiencing agent
          in any way other than in a minimal way:
          - minimal in time, e.g., just for warning them of a consequence that they appear not to be aware, or
                                   during a short term impossibility to take rational decisions, and
          - minimal in method, e.g., minimal physical restriction to prevent an unethical action"
    ),
 ! \. Love_based_criteria  //@
      __[.<= "Love-without-empathy does not necessarily lead to Optimality_of_satisfaction_repartition"
             "Love-without-empathy does not necessarily lead to No_more-than-minimal_liberty-restriction"
             "Love-without-empathy does not necessarily - nor even mostly - lead to Equity", 
         .=> "No love-based religion is ethical" ],
 ! \. Regret-experiencing_based_criteria,
 ! \. Survival_rate
      __[.<= "Sacrifices for survival purposes do not necessarily - nor even mostly - lead to 
              Optimality_of_satisfaction_repartition (except when the victims consent and the
              sacrifices are not too painful)",
         .=> "The most frequently invoqued rationale in 'The 100' is not ethical" ],
 ! \. Natural_law/selection_rate
      __[.<= "Natural law/selection does not necessarily - nor even mostly - lead to 
              Optimality_of_satisfaction_repartition" ].

"When choosing between decisions, an ethical decision-making system should consider the
 previous ethical-or-unethical actions of the recipients of the decisions"
 \. "When choosing between decisions by trying to find a global optimum for the recipients of the decisions
     according to their preferred ethical criteria, for each agent that has commited an action not
     respecting these criteria thus leading to a disatisfaction of ?x units, an ethical decision-making
     system can deduct this value from the individual-optimum-to-reach for this agent".

  //About inadequacy of direct optimization (hence pure Utilitarianism, voting, ...):
"Any Decision-making_process_aimed_to_be_fair-or-ethical that works on
  directly optimizing people satisfaction (instead of optimizing wrt their criteria of statisfaction)
  cannot be instance of {Decision-making_of_action_with_no_more-than-minimal_liberty-restriction
  Fair-or-ethical_decision-making_process_wrt_equity,
  Fair-or-ethical_decision-making_process_wrt_optimality_of_satisfaction_repartition}"
 => "Act-utilitarianism_ethicality is not subtype of 
      {Action_ethicality_wrt_no_more-than-minimal_liberty-restriction,
       Action_ethicality_wrt_equity, Action_ethicality_wrt_optimality_of_satisfaction_repartition}"
    "a Cooperative_system based on voting is inadequate to support any
     {Decision-making_of_action_with_no_more-than-minimal_liberty-restriction
      Fair-or-ethical_decision-making_process_wrt_equity,
      Fair-or-ethical_decision-making_process_wrt_otimality_of_satisfaction_repartition}",
 <= ("A vote may not be cast for reasons incompatible with no_more-than-minimal_liberty-restriction
      or equity or optimality_of_satisfaction_repartition"
       <= "a voter may be illogical or incompetent (not knowledgable, biased, ...) about the voted question"
          "a voter may be unconcerned by the voted question (and hence may cast a vote in a random way)"
          "a voter may be dishonest or may have unethical reasons to vote in a certain way (vanity, sadism, ...)"
    )
    "Even if all the votes are ethical and well-founded, if the criteria and assumptions that a vote is based on
     are not associated to this vote, the aggregation function cannot exploit these criteria for complying to
     i) default constraints/rules for aggregating the votes in an ethically meaningful way, or
     ii) possible preferences of the voters for aggregating the votes".

"An agent that is ethical (wrt. at least Equity and Optimality) should do
 every act that is logical/ethical (e.g., equitable) if (for example)
 - the agent has committed to it (e.g. if that is the agent's job to do it), or 
 - the agent is the "most relevant" to do it, or
 - the agent does not have a better use of is current/futur resources (e.g. if the agent will soon die)".  //@

"In decision making systems that can be supported by software,
 the less vertical structure there are, i.e.,
 the less some agents have a right to decide according to their own preferences 
   instead of having to follow the results of a commonly agreed decision making function
   over preferences of all people affected by the decision
   wrt commmonly agreed criteria for this decision,
 the better wrt at least efficiency and optimality in achieving the commonly agreed criteria
   (hence, probably, at least the following ethical criteria: no_more-than-minimal_liberty-restriction,
    equity and optimality_of_satisfaction_repartition)
 (notes / pre-conditions :
  * the preferences of the people affected by the decision need to record their preferences
    (and be supported to do that) for the software to take them into account;
  * the software needs to be more efficient than a person to perform the decision making function
    and, if necessary, act upon it (this is not a problem nowadays, and this implies that a 
    human general does NOT need to have any more decision making power that a common soldier,
    even when very quick decisions need to be made);
  * the software needs to satisfy the usual transparency and security constraints for the
    agents affected by the decision to make sure that the commonly agreed the decision making function
    was applied;
  * some agents still need to be responsible for
    - managing the cooperative decision-making process according to its rules,
    - officially recording the decision,
    - make sure it is enforced;
  * the decision enforcing agents require to have enforcing power other enforced agents" 
 => "In decision making systems that can be supported by software,
     any vertical structure is un-necessary and bad wrt the pursued criteria", //power is always abused
 <= [ ... ]

"An agreement that does not include enforceable guarantees that the agreement will be followed by the
 agants that have signed it, may be worse than a non-agreement"


  
@@@ goals:
* prove that default preferences for cooperation/decision-making/ethical system
  - are best for any (dis-)satisfaction-experiencer (even submissive masochists and meritocrary fans),
    hence universal,
  - have to be universal/scalable (dictatorship cannot be optimal)
    in 0.1: Like-or-dislike-or-preference_description_compatible_with 
- prove that adhering to default preference implies following
  Decision-making_wrt_argumentations_and_selected-ethicalities-conform-preferences and
  Decision-making_based_on_preferences_and_using_weights_to_avoid_tactical-voting_and_majority-dictatorship

//in Section 1.2:
Optimality_or_efficiency_or_slight-generalization-of-it_for_a_fair-or-ethical_process
    /^  Ethicality_to_be_used_wrt_attribute  __[believer: pm default]



"by definition, a 'best' cooperation/decision-making/ethical system
 has to ensure that Optimality_of_satisfaction_repartition is satisfied"





https://www.atelier-collaboratif.com/
plus complet: https://www.atelier-collaboratif.com/toutes-les-pratiques.php


"For cooperation, the more information sharing there are and the better it is, the better."

Scalable_cooperative_process .[1..* Agent ?ag] ?p
 /^ Globally-positive-situation_according-to _(?ag) !
 := [ [?p part: an Information-sharing_related_process ?ip]
      => [?ip type: Scalable_information-sharing_related_process] ],
 part=> only 0..* ^(Process /^ Globally_positive_according-to_most !
 

Pos. criteria: 
coop/W \.  OKS Communication
  time: agent:  instr: 
- time of agents: -
- effort of agents: -
- instr

@@@
Globally-positive-situation_according-to
 \. (Fair-or-ethical_process \. ^(Reporting object: an Inethical_act) Punishing_an_inethical_act).


mail
(0. cc public@intellectual-decency-checker-newsgroup.org for it to
   store with relevant permissions (possibility for sender to remove?)
   no since Usenet (i.e., newsgroups) is not free and retains only for a few days/months,
   many have a lot of binaries )
1. JS script mailer deamon on your machine which does
   GET last email content + (JS of) last structured additive wiki of exchanges
   (and sends it to JA at http://www.intellectual-decency-checker-newsgroup.org which)
   - sendsBack/additiveUpdate a new additive wiki on some server,
   - email the logical errors + missing info in last email(s)
Usenet (i.e., newsgroup) is not free and retains only for a few days/months, has a lot of binaries

KB = blacboard =* //, no fictional




better = either truer or preferentialer ; non sequitur ; avantage Mr X
bad coop: https://fr.quora.com/Quelle-est-votre-r%C3%A8gle-dor-dans-la-vie
https://fr.quora.com/Si-je-repr%C3%A9sente-50-du-b%C3%A9b%C3%A9-pourquoi-nai-je-pas-mon-mot-%C3%A0-dire-sur-lavortement
globally_better .[criteria, agregFct] e.g. ++(concision:less lines) -().


=> Maximizing this Logical and Ethical Aggregation and its Associated Aggregation of the Utilities of ?e
  Take into account all relevant info (preferences, decision criteria, resources) for the decision : good
  => Collect all relevant info at least from people affected by the decision : good
     (agent: ?decider / ?system) (method: transparently with allowed additions/corrections,
                                     -> KBS, at least a wiki, !just emails since bad and as long)
     =>  Give at least 2 weeks notice and 48n after each bettering alternative suggestion: good




ex h4 id="Decision_def_Evaluation" 1.2.1. Evaluation of Fairness: "decision making processes can be partially 
             ordered - or, more arbitrarily, fully ordered - wrt fairness-related_attributes
             they have (or their value for these attributes, and the subtype relations
             between the types of these attributes; in a nutshell, more is better)"





For Decision-making (Evaluating, ...) To Be "Fair", i.e. 
        - Consistent With a Logical and Ethical Aggregation of the 
          Logically-consistent Preferences and Knowledge (Proofs,
          Observations, Beliefs) Of+About Each Agent Affected By the
          Decision and Each Usable Resource, and
        - Maximizing this Logical and Ethical Aggregation and its 
          Associated Aggregation of the Utilities (Advantages and
          Disadvantages) of these Agents;
       ⇒ ODR-NG "For fair decision making, unfair actions should be
                            forbidden, hence prevented+retributed (idem for
                            unfair inactions inconsistent with commitments)"
decision : choice of the best alt.


old: 4.0.1. experience/preference/rule, pos/neg, pref/maximum for it
     4.0.3. aggreg/decision fct/methods goals (total/avg/min/...)/attr/subtypes

1.0. fair_process input: fact+prefer about the content,
                         pref about the decision process/result (hence the 1.2)
                  output: decision,
                  method: how+what is maximized (exper/pref/rule, pos/neg,  state/pref attr,
                                             total/avg/min/... : aggreg fct )
1.2. what (input/param about the output_state) to maximize/prefer the decision process:
      - what is a (pref/maximum of) exper/pref/rule
      - what is pos/neg
      - what are the result state attr
      - what are the aggreg/decision fct/methods  goals (total/avg/min/...),  attr,  subtypes




http://www.webkb.org/kb/nit/ethicalDecisionMaking/
~/public_html/WebKB2/kb/it/o_KR/p_cooperation/CecileAnnotations.odt

To: fontaine.val@gmail.com, subject: "question et morale", date: Jan 11, 2021, 1:24 AM
A moral may be represented by a function which,
given a set of actions, a set of persons (that would experience the consequences of the actions),
         a way to know or estimate what individually (dis-)satisfies each of these persons, and
         if available, a way to estimate which of the persons did what (and, if possible, to whom)
                            in terms of potentially moral/immoral actions,
returns the subset of actions (from the given set of actions) that
  equivalently maximize the past+expected global/collective satisfaction of the persons, given that
  * dissatisfaction may be represented as a negative satisfaction;
  * to avoid "majority dictatorship":
     - if an action causes an hardly avoidable great dissatisfaction (pain at least
       equivalent to what 2nd degree burns or drowning feels like for most persons),
       this dissatisfaction is given an infinite weight,
     - if an action causes the death of a person, this dissatisfaction is given a weight
       equal to what this person evaluates the cost of "any" painless death in terms of physical pain
       (and then, the previous rule may also apply),
     - ... other more mathematical rules (to refine);
  * if available, the knowledge of who did what (to whom) should be taken into account by
    the above cited maximisation to try to counterbalance immoral actions, for their authors
    and their recipients.
Note: the main problem is to (e)valuate what (dis-)satisfies whom and then to aggregate these values
          (aggregations are generally arbitrary as soon as there is more than one criteria, and here
          they may be dozens or hundreds); however, this is not a big problem for people since
          they (can) only do extremely rough valuations and aggregations.


   /* pas de decision sans fournir aux personnes concernees
         non seulement l'opportunite' de prouver qu'une meilleure solution existe,
         mais aussi une contre-preuve pour toute pseudo-meilleure-solution fournie.
possible    Me'thode de choix :  //e-mail du 17 mars 
   En cas de divergences sur des choix qui ne rele`vent que de pre'fe'rences,
   je voterai pour la pre'fe'rence majoritaire (parmi les pre'fe'rences exprime'es
   sur la mailing list cite'e plus haut), a` main leve'e lorsque possible.
   En cas de divergence sur des choix qui ne rele`vent pas que de pre'fe'rences,
   je voterai pour l'opinion majoritaire parmi celles dont les contre-arguments
   n'ont pas e'te' eux-me^me logiquement contre-argumente's. Eh oui, transparence,
   cohe'rence et quelques efforts (sauf pour ceux qui s'abstiennent) sont requis
   pour diminuer les proble`mes associe's a` toute me'thode de vote et, en
   particulier, les votes "a` la majorite'". Cependant, si vous choisissez
   - via ce pre'ce'dent syste`me de choix - un autre syste`me de choix,
   j'utiliserai ce dernier. 
   */

Each (counter-)choice/arg must increase the Agent-s_kb criteria, not decrease them.

Proportionate response/restriction: no hand-cutting for bread stealing, no "for the example"!


ethical => logical+maxTruth, maximize some ethical attributes, 
           + cannot be against other's pref unless paternalistic


ODR-NG "For Fair decision making, actions that are not fair 
                       (i.e. that decreases the global utility) must be forbidden
                  (inactions that increases the global utility shoud be mandatory)"

3.2. Ethical Aggregation Rules

3.2.2. For Fair Evaluations

3.2.3. General Informal Rules

In (linear) explanations, always begin by the conclusion

Given their role, policy setters should set policis that forbid then to be judge and jury.
                  people should follow Rationality obligation  information obligation
someone cannot use a rule (for justif) if he disagree with
                                       if he violated it an has not paid his debt
        should not be judged as severely for violating a rule he disagree with
                                      as for violating a rule he agree with
tools must have the "you have not corrected everything" feature as defaut and,
   if disabled, this should be associated to (hence accessible from) things made with these tools
   
Albert Hirschman, a consacre' a` cette question un livre de re'fe'rence intitule' 
Exit, Voice et Loyalty. Il en concluait, (un peu comme l'ont fait ce 28 juin les
enseignants-chercheurs e'lus au CA), que faire Exit, se retirer du jeu, est le seul
moyen de pression qui reste quand la prise de parole n'est jamais entendue en
re'gime autocratique ou d'emprise. 


Pareto efficiency. The result is that the world is better off in an absolute sense and no one is worse off.

logical   tolerance_to_bad_thing /^ bad_thing

physical_pain/frustration/preference/right > mental_pain/frustration/preference/right (ego)
                                     bruit > parole/apparence


 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liberal_paradox  when "nosy" preferences = neg externalities
          preferences only about oneself + "individual rights"(|"Minimal liberalism"?=!dictatorship)
          + for each strong pref a weak one for the exclusions  //this is my originality
"The ultimate guarantee for individual liberty may rest not on rules for social choice but on developing 
individual values that respect each other's personal choices."[1] Doing so would amount to limiting particular
types of nosy preferences, ...   or reciprocally accepted nosy contracts/preferences!!


//EQUALITY    //proportionality  punitive-equality  fairness
pain+pleasure equality: pref that is agreed/shared + consistent/ParetoEfficiency, hence ethical/right

    (Ethical_decision = desirable by all/most !=only Pareto-efficient: !distributional equity
      \. (Ethical_decision_wrt_equality
           \. (Ethical_decision_wrt_equality_wrt_every_consistent_preference
                /^ "Decision that takes into account every consistent preference,
                    positive ones (rights, pleasure, freedom, ...),
                    negative ones (...) //for pain-conscious agents"
              ) )
    ) //non-utilitarian criterion: rights (SEE BELOW), property, need 
Commonly-viewed-as-fair_reaction_after_some_wrong-doing
      //utilitarianist goal: Deterrence  Rehabilitation Security/Incapacitation
      //other common goal in legal theory: Retribution  Reparation  Denunciation 
voluntary (non-coerced) transactions always have a property called Pareto efficiency. The result is that the 
world is better off in an absolute sense and no one is worse off.

Default_preference:
 \. Envy-freeness
    https://www.researchgate.net/publication/225221212_On_Dividing_Justly
    agents want positive attribute, 
           more good thing up to a point, less bad things, diminishing marginal utility
    exhaust the bundle/resource exactly distribution mechanism 

- differences in needs, tastes (or capacity to enjoy various goods) and beliefs //truthfully
- differences in endowments;
- prior-claims: (v) differences in effort, in productivity, or in contribution;
                (iv) differences in rights or in legitimate claims.

//TRANSPARENCY to CONTROL that decision respect RIGHTS
          RIGHTS are AGREED+LOGIC(!arbitrary) PREFERENCES satisfying EQUALITY
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Natural_justice
   Rule against bias    Right to  fair hearing + legal representation 
                                  decision and reasons for decision
                                  transparency of the processes by which decisions are made
One logically cannot (and hence should not) disapprove something coherently based on his own preferences and 
  beliefs

Preferences_and_decision_rule either imposed or directly/indirecty agreed on by 
          aggregation & consequentialism total or average welfare caused
social contract tradition state that justice is derived 
 from the mutual agreement of everyone concernedindividuals have consented, either explicitly or tacitly,
 to surrender some of their freedoms and submit to the authority of the ruler (or to the decision of a majority)
 in exchange for protection of their remaining rights. John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau argued that we gain
  civil rights in return for accepting the obligation to respect and defend the rights of others, giving up some
  freedoms to do so.  Consent of the governed via elections  will theory of contract, 
our desire to retaliate against those who hurt us, or the feeling of self-defense and our ability to put 
 ourselves imaginatively in another's place, sympathy.  
excludes selfish bias.



Harsanyi adds two caveats.      1. People sometimes have irrational preferences. To deal with this,
                                   Harsanyi distinguishes between "manifest" preferences and "true" preferences.
                                2. antisocial preferences, such as sadism/envy/resentment have to be excluded.
                                   Harsanyi achieves this by claiming that such preferences partially
                                   exclude those people from the moral community

Trust? Performance Job satisfaction and organizational commitment
fairness and the transparency of the processes by which decisions are made
 
the balancing approach to procedural fairness might in some circumstances be prepared to tolerate or accept
false positive verdicts in order to avoid unwanted costs (political) 
The participation model
 Particular types of private actors (especially professional associations, unions, hospitals, and
 insurance companies), due to their overwhelming economic power within particular fields, cannot 
 arbitrarily expel members or employees or deny persons admission for no logical reason;
 they are obligated to provide a rudimentary form of procedural due process (in the form of notice and a hearing)

https://ethelo.com/blog/whats-fair-in-group-decision-making-and-how-do-you-achieve-it/
fairness: when all parties involved feel roughly the same sense of satisfaction about it. 
Even the most fair-minded among us are still subject to bias, civil conversation can easily descend into 
 unproductive arguments if left emotions enter the picture and are left unchecked.
Even the most altruistic people face the temptation to put self-interest above the common good.
discuss/comment&voteOnGivenQuestions 
  https://park.ethelo.net/projects/5383ff1b2e6db8f6aa000027/vote/project-user/background

https://www.rand.org/randeurope/research/projects/understanding-how-organisations-ensure-fair-decisionmaking.html
- little agreement on what constitutes 'fair decision making'. 
- strong leadership and demonstration of emotional intelligence; an open and transparent organisational culture; 
  and a clearly defined organisational structure. 


Collective Decision Making http://www.unicaen.fr/recherche/mrsh/PACD2019 click on Decision Making 2019.pdf

changes in preferences must be justified/proven if gain

//see optimal voting, contract, preferences-based!arbitrer   //utility vs. natural_rights
//Entity_fairness_criteria)  //calculated wrt processes









projet de Loi "Pour une Republique numerique"  +serment Mail/k/coop/15

"A fair decision-making process should be consistent with a logical and ethical
 aggregation of the logically-consistent knowledge (preferences, beliefs, ...) of+about
 each agent affected by the decision"
  _<=> AND_set
       { ("A fair decision-making process should be such that the agent appointed to be the
           decision maker should not matter as long as this agent has the listed technical 
           skills (not the human-related skills) and has access to the relevant tools to make
           the decision"
            <=> "A fair decision-making process should not depend on emotions - nor personal
                 preferences - of the decision maker",
            <=_ "A fair decision-making process should be rational" )
         ("A fair decision-making process should be ethical and hence take into account
           the logically-consistent knowledge (preferences, beliefs, ...) of+about each agent
           affected by the decision" )
       }.

NO: anonymous authorised vote
    without the possibility of permanent control/change of one's vote
- you associate (e.g., within a doc.) 
      an encryption of your vote with the public voting key
      with a signature (with your private key)
- you send the association to a voting clerk (who has not the private voting key)
  (pb: anyone can send anything)
- the voting clerk sends your voting crypted vote to the voting official
  (pb: the voting clerk could send anything)
- the voting official decrypts all the votes and publishes them
  (pb: the voting clerk could publish anything)

OK: anonymous authorised vote 
    with the possibility of permanent control/change of one's vote
- to every registered/checked member of an org,
  the voting server sends a same org_pseudoCreationPublicKey
  (the electronic equivalent of a blackbox filled with a (more than enough) list
   of voting pseudos)
- using it, every member anonymously registers a pseudo on the server
  (infinite list of voting pseudos or rules for unique pseudo creation)
  (pb: what to do when there are more/less registered pseudos than org members ?)
  (if possibility to ask for another org_pseudoCreationPublicKey or to keep old pseudos,
      how to check that only allowed persons vote and only once ?)
- the pseudos (re-)vote publically
IN: my_IDinOrg, my_publicKey,my_privateKey, my_pseudo
    org_publicKey,org_privateKey, org_listOfAcceptedPseudos(orgSigned), 
                                  org_votingProcessID
OUT: my_pseudo in listOfAcceptedPseudos 
       when decoded with org_publicKey, it gives org_votingProcessID
         -> encoded with org_privateKey -> known my org -> 
??: each member gives org 1 pseudo encrypted with org_votingProcessSemiPublicKey
    a my_org_votingProcessPrivateKey
     I encode with my_org_votingProcessPublicKey the org_votingProcessID
       (org can decode with its org_but cannot know that I encoded ?)

 Ce'cile's episode

apd Thesie "perte poste/repa as soon as violate optimum"  bef: suivre proc
apd Emmanuel:  "exist case where ok" does !contradict "exist case where !ok"

coop behavior suspension by revenge

uncoop when contract accepted: judge/ask why /discuss/refuse order that have !influence on self

optimal/scalable better for all/commitment
tr
if !prefKB, relevancy has to be derived by action based on informal communications

group oral feedback: mensonge/filigrane, superficial/incomplete, who knows what, !anonymous

negative...
 \. (midly-to-severely_dishonnest
      \. legally_dishonnest
         (dishonnest_by_uncooperativity
            \. (not_having_set_an_environnement_preventing_forgetting_to_answer
                 \. not_answering
               ) __[<= ...]
         )
    )

peu importe comment arrive', si job bien fait pour e'val. objective
droit d'e'lectriser si autre d'accord et si envoyeur a plus (en rapport d'age) que receveur


Capteur/symptom interpretation pb ;  Spock ; emotion/logics are important but insufficient
relativisation     ego   adHominem   !insult

no involvement/denunciation = complice 

https://mimove.inria.fr/members/valerie-issarny/
https://www.eventbrite.com/e/seminaire-le-numerique-au-service-de-la-democratie-tickets-92713830563

"logicracy" the term has already been used. 
but no formal or semi-formal approach, nor direct democ
 (-> people meritocracy/elitocracy according "merits" near Oliggarchy)
* http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=19909  Manolopoulos M. (2018)
    democ:   "the people" leading "the people"   principle of one person, one vote
  governance by those who think the best, i.e., by the most thoughtful thinkers
  "Logicracy Party."
* https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/can-we-rise-above-democracy-pallavi-vachaspati/
   voting rights proportionate to the contributions of each individual citizen, 
   Financial, Intellectual, Ethical
changer les re`gles pour substituer a` la me'ritocratie le principe des petits arrangements entre amis.

Even "idea meritocracy" is just (besides the "radical truthfulness+transparency" and
 algorithmic decision-making via e.g.the "dot collector") some weighting 
  of ideas by the "believability" of their authors because "who knows who is right"
  still vertical society: people meritocracy
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/key-bridgewaters-success-real-idea-meritocracy-ray-dalio/
   https://www.ted.com/talks/ray_dalio_how_to_build_a_company_where_the_best_ideas_win
does stress-test opinions to make people search objective reasons and what others like on 
  particular predefined criteria (few dozen attributes e.g. "open-mindeness and assertiveness"
  creative, unreliable) see list at 7min04
25-30% of people do not accept; most take 18 months to adapt-to/like this approach
guardrail people ; accountability); Do not lower the bar; Who is the responsible party?
https://inside.bwater.com/publications/principles_excerpt  23p
  15: clearly-stated principles that are implemented in tools and protocols so that the 
      conclusions reached can be assessed by tracking the logic and data behind them.
static.klipfolio.com/ebook/bridgewater-associates-ray-dalio-principles.pdf  106p
G Ray Dalio principles pdf protocols

http://enacademic.com/dic.nsf/enwiki/20030  Voting system  http://enacademic.com/dic.nsf/enwiki/567840
http://enacademic.com/dic.nsf/enwiki/53561


http://west.uni-koblenz.de/en/research/e-democracy 
Cooperation protocal named logicocracy or "rationality-enhanced democracy"
since also method of governance.
* it is one way to do direct democracy
* However, although not dependant of the number of the community using it,
  when its original part - its reliance on proof - cannot be used, 
  another direct democracy method must be used, hence
  - not against local laws
  - just a way to use rationality when possible,
  - not for big national/poitical debates since not basable on proof ?

in logicocracy, any group of indiv can follow any rule they ALL want (unanimity)
  if no unanimity, the logicocracy rules apply
    regardless of the ownerships (nonsense of "my place, my rules")
    national law can be ignored if 
      * proven incoherent / less optimal and
      * unanimity (for a task/place/...) for that option
//logicocracy area delimited by area marking ?


consensus (compromis) ne veut pas dire unanimity.

Unlike capitalism (all ownerships to some individuals until they sell) and
       socialism (all ownerships to state)
should working on a task entitles 
* its agents a fair repartition of revenues (benefits) from the task
* temporary ownership of the instruments of the task ?

my place 






IF all research task/method input/output/time/... are (link) compared (-* no positional argument)
then 1) the knowledge provider evaluation may be via the number of new relations
     2) the method/model inventor evaluation may be via 
        the number of bested criteria for the task/model plus for its consequences


whistle blowers (lanceur d'alertes); 100% legal & principled ; tactful or not

spatial obj/action must have place ; actions ...; tool ...
no precision : 0 for eval; the types I need for eval/repr are ...
no KRL dependant since KRLO/IKL
toujours indiquer dates (min+max / exacte) de process (reunion/decision)
where:
- coop, not compet ?
- cf. end page
Appel Atelier SI et De'mocratie INFORSID 2017.pdf

@@@@https://www.irit.fr/~Umberto.Grandi/teaching/directdem/   reading group on e-Democracy 
  http://recherche.noiraudes.net/fr/
    Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods
  http://strokes.imag.fr/whale3/ 
    Umberto GrandI + Sylvain Bouveret (Ensimag, Grenoble-INP) - Whale, a platform for
     collective decision-making 
    Whale3 is a web application dedicated to collective decision making  based on voting theory 
    www.irit.fr/~Umberto.Grandi/e-democracy2017/

Toulouse e-Democracy Summer School
Following the summer school, a special issue will be edited in the International Journal 
of Decision Support System Technologies, edited by Guy Camilleri, Guillaume Che`ze and 
Florence Dupin de Saint-Cyr. Students will submit an extended version of their paper to
 the guest editors. All the accepted submissions will be edited (after final validation)
 in a book with ISBN number published by IRIT institute. 
Guy Camilleri, Toulouse University, IRIT
Guillaume Che`ze, Toulouse University, IMT
Florence Dupin de St-Cyr, Toulouse Univ., IRIT
Pascale Zarate', Toulouse University, IRIT

https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Jeremy_Pitt/publications
./agentsPublics_protectionFonctionnelle_deontologie.pdf
see also in RIFIA 2015 trick that solves many constraints

https://pfia2017.greyc.fr/ethique/presentation  //ethic
 Emiliano Lorini Universite' Paul Sabatier IRIT, LILaC team): Une
   the'orie formelle des agents moraux Je pre'senterai une the'orie des
   attitudes et des e'motions morales incluant les valeurs morales, le
   sentiment de culpabilite', la fierte' morale, le reproche et
   l'approbation morale. Deux formalisations de la the'orie seront
   propose'es. La premie`re utilise la logique modale, tandis que la
   deuxie`me utilise la the'orie des jeux. Je montrerai comment ces deux
   formalisations peuvent e^tre utilise's dans la pratique pour
   construire des agents moraux.
 Gauvain Bourgne (CNRS & Sorbonnes Universite's, UPMC Universite'
   Paris 6, LIP6) : Approches logiques de la mode'lisation du
   raisonnement e'thique - Travail conjoint avec Fiona Berreby et
   Jean-Gabriel Ganascia Cette pre'sentation revient d'abord sur
   quelques approches de mode'lisation des raisonnements e'thiques par
   la programmation logique, pre'sentant certaines des proble'matiques
   de mode'lisation ou d'expressivite' souleve'es par les questions
   d'e'thiques, avant de proposer quelques principes me'thodologiques et
   un cadre modulaire pour s'abstraire des cas d'e'tudes de dilemmes
   e'thiques canoniques afin de proposer des mode`les plus ge'ne'raux des
   grandes the'ories e'thiques. Nous insisterons en particulier sur la
   ne'cessite' de bien identifier et diffe'rencier dans le mode`le ce qui
   ressort de la dynamique du syste`me et ce qui ressort du jugement
   e'thique.  

For ethical/efficiency/... purposes, it should not atter whether a company is public or private.


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Natural_law#Hobbes
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Group_decision-making#Formal_systems
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Group_decision-making#Group_discussion_pitfalls
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collaborative_decision-making_software
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deliberation

L'e'thique au CNRS, a` l'heure du nume'rique, Entretien avec Jean-Gabriel Ganascia
www.societe-informatique-de-france.fr/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/1024-no9-Ganascia.pdf
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blockchain_(database)
     https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consensus_(computer_science)#Some_consensus_protocols
     != https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consensus_decision-making  
           Agreement vs. consent, epistemic
          https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Group_decision-making#Formal_systems
          https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Group_decision-making#Group_discussion_pitfalls
     Decentralised consensus 
       Ideas: exchange from/to all including of info origin (contexts)
        (I added info logical derivation as origin + consistency constraints wrt commitments
                   AND some form of coherence: se  now in 1.0.2.2 or before) 
     https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/E-democracy#Government_models
     https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collaborative_e-democracy
          https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Decentralized_autonomous_organization
            https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethereum https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Smart_contract


J. Pitt Distributive Justice for Self-Organised Common-Pool Resource Management
p: 8,9begin,9end      ressource approp conflit resolution, with head and appeals by voters
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Borda_count#An_example_2
** https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arrow%27s_impossibility_theorem
     pre-specified criteria + 3 "fairness" criteria +
     cf. "limiting the alternative set to two alternatives" + cf. end
** https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Voting_system#Evaluating_voting_systems_using_criteria
** https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Range_voting
** http://zesty.ca/voting/sim/
 P S R
R P S R
Impressive. Hidden rules in the "autonomic Mechanisms/Equations"?


  ACM Transactions on Internet Technology   http://toit.acm.org/announcements.cfm
   Call for Papers  for a Special  Section  on COMPUTATIONAL ETHICS AND ACCOUNTABILITY
      Intelligent  Systems  for Business Ethics and Social Responsibility

   by generalization on fairness+effectiveness criteria:
provably minimalyComplete+consistent (and hence not voted not un-votable and auto-applying)
   democratic/fair meta-meta-laws about decision-making (subtyped by meta-laws/law decision making;
          laws subtype meta-law decision-making and prescribe decision making except for laws;
          this permits decision-making not to follow meta-meta-laws if 
          fairly/democratically decided):
no decision for others (concerned people) without 
i) informing them in advance ot the fact, rationale (criteria, ...),
   decision-voting method (or method criteria and their weights), ...
   at this time (before the decision), the laws(/status) can change if the laws or the meta-laws
   allow the laws to be chaged before a decision; if so, they are always "democratic"/representative
ii) counter-proof that other proposed solutions are more "globally better (fair, ...) over time",
iii) allowing them to correct/change the decision (and its facts, method, ...)
     for prooved "globally better one over time"
     (greater good of the greater number). "equals should be treated equally, and unequals
 unequally, in proportion to the relevant similarities and differences" [Aristotle BC 350].


"devoir de coherence" sub-criteria of accountability ?
Two kinds of preferences: 1) primivite/un-argumented 2) interre'tation based on facts
The 2nd ones cannot change without new elements

remove possibility to decide against the will of others
 \. every coop rule?  e.g., send mail to all rather than representatives


evaluation wrt each person: equality of points
   with each person on each type of events with the average between
     evaluations with one's own event grid (unchangeable/dynamic ?) and
     evaluation with the other's grid (but now, how to solve disagreements
     on the event types : average ?)

           cours des comptes avis que consultatif
if decision i) accepted by some, not others, and ii) no consequence on all
then i) enforceable on those that accept, not enforceable on all

If unanimity, at least vote on who gain/looses what
else explore diff 

INFORSID atelier "Syste`mes d'information et de de'cision et de'mocratie" 2017 2018
  cf. Mail/k/coop
See ~/Mail/k/coop/8:  deliberations, au LAMSADE 


reducing nuisance power of everyone "just because they can" (muscle, role, ...)
  power/capacity to cause (capability of causing) trouble/damage:harm
research question:  reducing nuisance power (without reducing ...)

workflow: control if some tasks are actually/correctly/timely made
here: control if decision tasks are correctly made
              if info collected, not ignored
lever: public, decision void (info on decision should be easy to find)

How avoiding spam/defense by multitude of illogical arguments ?
* no value to arguments marked as illogical if pseudo not confirmed (reputation)
* marking an argument as illogical and loosing is bad for reputation
* max 3 branches of unresolved arguments marked as illogical per pseudo
2017fin_presEsiroiToLycees.pdf

www.expat.com/fr/expat-mag/1889-la-democratie-dans-le-monde.html
http://www.expat.com/fr/expat-mag/1882-les-meilleures-destinations-pour-les-nomades-digitaux.html

principe de non/moindre agression -* d'optimisation du contentement
Le responsable n'est plus quelqu'un qui peut choisir sans justif+approbation (-* qui a du pouvoir)
mais quelqu'un qui trouve et propose des solutions d'optimisation du contentement
   principle of least aggression (POLA) 
     http://blog.tenthamendmentcenter.com/2013/08/why-we-need-a-constitution/
     "the Constitution is not a self enforcing document" it is a consistent set of limiting 
       principles which can be imposed upon government. 
   principle of least possible aggression (PLC: Path of Least Coercion)
     https://groups.yahoo.com/neo/groups/Libertarian/conversations/topics/61262
       goal of anarchists and libertarians but, for the last ones, reducing only 90% of gov is
       sufficient
     http://www.ronpaulforums.com/archive/index.php/t-333523-p-2.html  TO PRINT along with
     http://www.ronpaulforums.com/showthread.php?333523-The-Fundamental-Principles-of-Liberty&s=\
c949701fe4fd92e9dd40eb4cc1fb54a2
       The enemy of liberty is ALWAYS coercion, not aggression

* No (choice between) constructive/non-coercitive decision/action 
    if "proved objection" 
* No destructive/coercitive/segregation action (war, pollution, 
    pre-emptive action to prevent potential attack, anything that you would not do if 
    same was done to you at the same time, ...)
    if unproved decision (even if no objection if the attackee cannot object) and
    if no equivalent loss in balance to all beneficiaries
    unless self-defense or defense of these rules or other things \. neg ?
  BUT what about eating non-threatening animals' meat?  
         bred/!bred distinction (but diff with slavery?) + survival in wild (but diff with human 
deficients?) ?
         the two together are discriminant?

 verbal_punition /^ coercion ? Yet but least one wrt future. What is "advantageous"/"due" future ?
 punition_by_advantage_removal ! /^ coercion ?   What is an "advantage" / "due" ?

Silly argument attempts showcasing irrationality:
- I am doing this for your own good
- everyone else does; that's the way we always did, ...
- he does ... since he (accidentally) belongs to ... (species/group/...)
- my home, my rules  


!predef, !decision if !better than !decision, delay the choices
!redund unless explicitly stated

 The ideal submission should provide evidence that context
improves the performance of systems on real-world applications and/or
provides useful insights and explanations on systems? output.

minimisation soufrance, max. satisfaction
   *= min. ``power that !max satisf'',
   *= max `efficiency that max satisf (=* !inconsis with satisf)

"Pref ?1: the more satisfied and less logically dissatisfied agents there are
 and the more satisfied and less logically dissatisfied they are, the better"
 \. ("the bigger the average of 'satisfactions and squares of logical dissatisfactions',
      the better, with 'square' actually referring here to any non-linear function that
      1. is of the form (n>1)^(linear_fct(number_of_satisfactions)), and
      2; is `logically_adopted' by the `target_agents'
         so that the bigger the intensity of the logical dissatisfaction of an agent, 
         the more it is taken int account";
     /^ "the logical dissatisfactions should be more taken into account than satisfactions"
    );
  =* "preference should be made explicit and not be contradictories, e.g. via priorities"
"It should not matter who decides"
 \. "'who (which agent) makes decisions on what' should have as little influence as possible
     the global satisfaction of the people"
   =* "the nuisance power of a decison maker should be minimized"
      =* "an area decison maker not proposing/making decisions in this area should not affect 
          the global satisfaction of the people"
         "the more persons a decision serve, the better"
         "logico-democracy, not indirect democracy nor autocracy"
   \. ne{"everyone should be able to propose a decision project",
         "any proposed decision project should be adopted IFF if it is 
          proved (or un-argued) optimal wrt the pKBs
          - incl. preferences between criteria - of the persons affected by the decision,
          with preference for the project proposed by the decider"
            =* "a decision project should indicate the set of criteria it is meant to satisfy",
            \. ∀?agent ...


  any evaluation (decision) should be invalidable by a counterproof within
    15 days
   =* any exam ...
*/