Individual km#formal_logic
>part of: #logic.philosophy the branch of philosophy that analyzes inference
url: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Formal_logic
>part: km#philosophical_logic__philosophicallogic deals with formal descriptions of natural language and hence philosophical logicians have contributed a great deal to the development of non-standard logics
>part: km#mathematical_logic__symbolic_logic__metamathematics__metamathematic
>part: km#application_of_techniques_of_formal_logic_to_mathematics
>part: km#logicism pioneered by philosopher-logicians such as Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell: the idea was that mathematical theories were logical tautologies, and the programme was to show this by means to a reduction of mathematics to logic. The various attempts to carry this out met with a series of failures, from the crippling of Frege's project in his Grundgesetze by Russell's Paradox, to the defeat of Hilbert's Program by Gödel's incompleteness theorems; however, every rigorously defined mathematical theory can be exactly captured by a first-order logical theory; Frege's proof calculus is enough to describe the whole of mathematics, though not equivalent to it
>part: km#application_of_mathematical_techniques_to_formal_logic
>part: km#sentential_logic__propositional_logic__propositional_calculus proof theory for reasoning with propositional formulas as symbolic logic; it is extensional
>part: km#predicate_logic__predicatelogic__predicate_calculus permits the formulation of quantified statements such as "there is at least one X such that..." or "for any X, it is the case that...", where X is an element of a set called the domain of discourse
>part: km#FOL__first-order_logic__firstorderlogic__first-order_predicate_calculus__predicate_logic__predicatelogic FOL is distinguished from HOL in that it does not allow statements such as "for every property, it is the case that..." or "there exists a set of objects such that..."; it is a stronger theory than sentential logic, but a weaker theory than arithmetic, set theory, or second-order logic; it is strong enough to formalize all of set theory and thereby virtually all of mathematics
>part: km#PCEF_logic__logic_of_positive_conjunctive_existential_formulas
>part: km#HOL__higher-order_logic based on a hierarchy of types
>part: km#logic_for_reasoning_about_computer_programs
>part: km#Hoare_logic
>part: km#logic_for_reasoning_about_concurrent_processes_or_mobile_processes
>part: km#CSP
>part: km#CCS
>part: km#pi-calculus
>part: km#logic_for_capturing_computability__logicforcapturingcomputability
>part: km#computability_logic__computabilitylogic
>part: km#non-modal_logic__nonmodallogic__extensional_logic__extensionallogic as opposed to intensional logics, the truth value of a complex sentence is determined by the truth values of its sub-sentences
>part: km#modal_logic__intensional_logic__intensionallogic sentences are qualified by modalities such as possibly and necessarily; both "Bush is president" and "2+2=4" are true, yet "Necessarily, Bush is president" is false, while "Necessarily, 2+2=4" is true
>part: km#deontic_logic__deonticlogic
>part: km#epistemic_logic__epistemiclogic
>part: km#temporal_logic system of rules and symbolism for representing, and reasoning about, propositions qualified in terms of time
>part: km#tense_logic__tenselogic
>part: km#computational_tree_logic__CTL
>part: km#linear_temporal_logic
>part: km#conditional_logic__conditionallogic
>part: km#classical_logic
>part: km#non_classical_logic
>part: km#type_theory branch of mathematics and logic that concerns itself with classifying entities into sets called types
>part: km#term_logic__traditional_logic__traditionallogic
>part: #Aristotelian_logic
>part: km#dialectical_logic__dialecticallogic
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